One leading commentator recently sugnot only insulated incumbents from competigested in the Harvard Law Review that, so long tion. They also froze into place a key feature of as the choice for chief executive reflects the mathe 1990s districts that has escaped the notice jority will, there may be nothing "inherently of the press, political scientists, and most re-wrong with a legislature that fails consistently districting attorneys and experts: a "distributo reflect and transmit the changing preferences tional bias" that gives Republicans a roughly of [the] majority. "1 I believe that position is 50-seat head start in the battle for control of wrong as a matter of both democratic theory Congress. In combination, these two features--and constitutional history. And I find it particextreme protection of incumbents and a powularly unconvincing today, when the chief exerful pro-Republican bias--might prevent ecutive of the United States was elected without the support of a plurality of voters and his predecessor twice failed to win an outright majority.
Sam Hirsch is a partner in the Washington, D.C. peting remedial maps for partisan fairThe sixth part explains how the combination ness, responsiveness, and accountability, of incumbent protection and pro-Republican rather than relying solely on formal critebias might make it difficult for Democrats to ria such as compactness and respect for retake the House even if a sizeable shift in pubcounty and municipal lines, lic opinion gives them clear majority support • Rather than pretending to "take politics in the electorate. Finally, the seventh part exout of the process" by creating supposedly plores several possible legal responses to the apolitical redistricting commissions, States problems identified in this Article, rejects most should place these same overtly political of them as infeasible or unwise, and recomconcerns--partisan fairness, responsivemends three specific reforms. ness, and accountability--squarely on their list of redistricting criteria and should implement them systematically NON-PARTISAN NON-ISSUES IN THE and empirically.
2001-2002 ROUND OF REDISTRICTING
The first part of this Article quickly recaps In the lead-up to the 2000 census, redistrictsome pre-redistricting predictions, both political ing attorneys and experts fixated on several isand legal, that went awry. The second part cornsues having little or nothing to do with politipares the election results of 2002 with those of cal partisanship.
Most of those issues turned 1972, 1982, and 1992 and confirms that 2002 was out to be nonstarters.
indeed anomalous in its degree of incumbent protection and noncompetitiveness. The third • For the first time, the Census Bureau part shows that this anomaly was caused by rewould simultaneously release two paraldistricting, as vulnerable incumbents were syslel sets of redistricting data--a traditional tematicaUy bolstered. It also shows that partisan headcount and a data set adjusted to corpatterns in federal elections have become much rect for the differential "undercounting" more consistent from office to office (i.e., from of certain racial and language minority President to U.S. Senator to U.S. Representative) groups, children, and renters. States that and from election cycle to election cycle, which chose to redistrict using one data set enables political mapmakers today to gerrywould inevitably be hauled into court by mander with unprecedented efficiency, proponents of the other data set. But that The fourth part demonstrates that the new controversy was largely averted when the districts have recreated a hefty pro-Republican Bush administration refused to release the distributional bias by disparately "packing" adjusted data in 2001. 2 and "cracking" Democratic voters. That ex-
• For the first time, the Census Bureau plains the curious fact that A1 Gore, who won would give Americans the option of identhe popular vote in the 2000 presidential contifylng with more than one of the governtest, would have carried fewer than 200 of the ment's six racial categories--generating 435 newly redrawn districts, no fewer than 63 possible combinations (or The fifth part examines different state-level 126, when Hispanic and non-Hispanic were characteristics and finds that the bulk of the nationwide bias was generated in four large, The only guarPa.) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed as moot sub nora. antee, state legislators were told, was that lubelirer v. Vieth, 123 S. Ct. 67 (2002) . 61 do not mean to suggest that the Voting Rights Act and you will be sued, probably from both sides. But the Shaw doctrine had no effect on the districts drawn in in fact, most congressional and state-leg-2001 and 2002. They did. But as a practical (not theoretiislative plans were not challenged in court; cal) matter, the tension between the two types of raceand when they were, the courts consisbased claims was largely resolved once the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Easley v. Cromartie,532 tently rejected race-based claims, s Minor-U.S. at 241-58, upholding North Carolina's redrawn ity officeholders who had been "outside Twelfth Congressional District. the room" a decade ago were now on the 7Throughout this Article, I count Vermont's independent Congressman Bernie Sanders as a Democrat and Virinside, protecting their incumbencies ginia's formerly independent Congressman Virgil Goode every bit as effectively as white incumas a Republican. (I974-1980, reapportionment 1984-1990, election Category 1994_2000) (1972, 1982, I992) (1992, 1994, 1996,1998,and 2000 (1996 ( , handily in 1994 ( , 1996 ( , 1998 ( , and 2000 ( . But in 1998 ( , 2000 ( , and 2002 in their respective party priderdog campaigns that scored come-from-bemaries. Overall, only four percent of the Rep-hind victories for Governor of Maryland and resentatives in the 108th Congress won their U.S. Senator from Georgia, respectively. initial election by defeating an incumbent in a Whether one focuses on the incumbents who primary. 32Thus, it appears unlikely that a lack retired from the House, the (very few) incumof competitiveness in general elections will be bents who were defeated on Election Day, or offset by heightened competition in party prithe incumbents who sought and won reelecmaries, tion, it is clear that the recent redistricting had a powerful, and historically distinctive, impact.
Retirements from the House
Although redistricting fatally injured a handful of House careers, in far more cases it had
Of course, defeating an incumbent in a prithe opposite effect, making incumbents more mary or general election is not the only way to secure. Contrary to the pattern established in drive him out of office. By a process of self-prior post-reapportionment election cycles (see selection, vulnerable incumbents who see the summary of data from 1972, 1982, and 1992 in handwriting on the wall often choose to run for Mar. 17,2002 ,at E2 ("Citizens will cast ballots in second most senior Democrat (John LaFalce) re-November, but their votes effectivelywere counted when tired after they were targeted to bear the burden the pols drew the lines.").
troubling feature of the 2002 districts, a topic and the exponent n (which political scientists that I will examine next. 37 call the "swing ratio") is 1, the formula describes perfectly proportional representation for the two major parties: Each party can ex-THE EFFECTS OF THE 2001-2002 ROUND pect to get a seat share equal to its vote OF REDISTRICTING ON PARTISAN BIAS share. As the plan's responsiveness to shifts in voting behavior increases and the exponent apAside from competitiveness and effects on proaches infinity, the formula describes a winincumbency, another defining feature of any ner-take-all system, roughly akin to at-large redistricting plan is the presence or absence of (rather than districted)
elections. With exsignificant partisan bias. Unfortunately, even tremely high responsiveness and low bias, a the most experienced redistricting attorneys bare 51% majority of votes will be magnified and experts often misunderstand the term into a 100% supermajority of seats. "partisan bias."
Although there is plenty of room for disagreement about the descriptively or norma-
What is "partisan bias"? tively "correct" value of the exponent (so long as it is greater than or equal to one), the basic In_ritively, the key feature of an unbiased re-formula has three good features. First, the fordistricting plan is that the political party whose mula demands that a 50/50 vote share genercandidates attract the most popular votes is re-ate a roughly 50/50 seat share, which seems warded with the most seats in the legislature, fair. Second, the formula is symmetrical, so that More broadly, an unbiased plan treats the two neither party systematically wins a substanmajor parties synunetrically. If they have equal tially larger "bonus" for capturing more than support in the electorate, they should win an half the votes. Third, on average, a party that equal number of seats in the legislature. Thus, a wins more than half the votes should win a 50% vote share should translate into a roughly share of seats at least proportionate to its share 50% seat share. If either party succeeds in at-of major-party votes, while a less popular party tracting support from more than half the elec-should win a share of seats that is at most protorate, it should be rewarded with more than half portionate to its major-party vote share. the seats--and neither party should profit more This analysis suggests a key, but often overfrom such success than would the other party, if looked, distinction: Partisan fairness and prothe tables were turned. For example, ff the De-portional representation are by no means synmocrats would be rewarded with 60% of the onymous. An electoral system that generates seats for winning 55% of the popular vote, then proportional representation is unbiased, but an an unbiased plan should likewise give Republiunbiased electoral system need not generate cans 60% of the seats if their candidates win 55% proportional representation. 39 For example, if of the vote. That is partisan fairness, in a nutshell.
Political scientists have reduced this intuitive notion to a formula for translating vote shares into seat shares. Generally, in a two-party, sin37Since drafting this Article, I have learned of one exgle-member districting system, 38 they assume ception:Professor Gary Jacobsonhas written a superb pathat, under an unbiased plan, the ratio of Demper arguing that, despite the continued closepartisan balance in the electorate, structural features of the electoral ocratic seats to Republican seats (SD/SR) system will make it difficult for Democrats to regain a should equal the ratio of Democratic votes to majority in either house of Congress. See Gary C. JacobRepublican votes (VD/Va), raised to some ex-son, Terror, Terrain,and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 MidtermElections, 118PoL.Scl. Q. (forthcoming 2003). ponential power. So SD/SR = (VD/VR)', n >-1. 3sin a single-member districting system, each district (For a plan biased to favor Democrats, the en-elects one and only one member to the legislative body, tire right-hand side of the equation would be so the total number of districts is identical to the size of multiplied by a number greater than one; for a the body.
39SeegenerallyEdward R.Tufte, TheRelationshipBetween plan with a pro-Republican bias, the multiplier SeatsandVotesin Two-PartySystems,67AM. POL.SCLREV. would be less than one.) If the plan is unbiased 54o, 540-54 (1973) . That was the only special election in 2001or 2002that respectively, according to whether they were carsuited in a partisan shift.Bush had carried the district narried by Gore or by Bush, and whether they rowly in 2000. in Gore districts. These "campaign effects" on Here, then, we have the answer to our first If those districts tend to vote for one political (such as Republicans). As the economy boomed party while high-turnout districts tend to vote in the 1990s, families that could afford better for the other party, then the party that is housing tended to migrate to more expensive strongest in the areas of low turnout will get a neighborhoods.
That migration caused lowerbetter return for its votes. That is turnout bias, income districts, which tend to vote Demosometimes referred to as the "cheap seats" phecratic, to become relatively underpopulated, nomenon because one party generally can exwhile higher-income percentage points, while the three Republican 48As Bruce Cain has correctly pointed out, the three sources of bias are not entirely independent of each other. victors won by 29, 11, and 8 points, respecFor example, landslide districts that demobilize voters tively. As is typically the case, the party that could exacerbate a plan's turnout bias. Based on the patterns summarized in Table  This , of course, is only a rough proxy for iden-7, then, we can draw a few conclusions about tifying the party that controlled redistricting and therefore had a license to gerrymander (absent any judicial intervention).
A handful of 61Either Gore or Bush won the major-party vote by less than seven percentage points (i.e., closer than 53.5% to States (with roughly a tenth of the Nation's 435 46.5%)in Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Washdistricts) used bipartisan or "nonpartisan" ington, Tennessee, Missouri, Wisconsin, Arizona, Mincollunissions to draw their congressional nesota, Oregon, Iowa, Arkansas, Nevada, New Mexico, lines. 62 In some States, one party had potenWest Virginia, Maine, and New Hampshire. 62AS it turned out, in most of these States neither party tially veto-proof supermajorities in both chainhad unified control of the political branches of state govbers of the legislature, which might have renemment in 2001, so most are categorized on Table 7 as dered irrelevant the party of the governor. In "split control" States.
63After trying to account for most of these caveats, the other States, regional, racial, or ideological di-Republican Party's national redistricting team concluded visions in the majority party may have made that 161new districts were in States with split control, 135 its numerical superiority illusory. 63 Even with were in States with Democratic control, 98were in States all of these caveats, however, this sixth factor with Republican control, 34 were in States with commissions, and 7 were in atqarge States, where no congreshas by far the greatest explanatory power in lo-sional redistricting took place. See Redistricting Departcating the source of distributional bias. ment, Counsel's Office,Republican National Committee, Gore did only slightly better in Democrati- the location of the pro-Republican distribuinvalidated as unconstitutional political gerrytional bias that distorts the national vote and manders, as I will soon discuss. gives Republicans a 50-seat head start in the of the 2002 plan also prevented the "one person, one vote" rule. But that will Republicans from amassing a larger majority in likely do no more than get them back to where the 108th Congress.) they started the decade (at roughly 212 or 214 The confluence of low responsiveness and seats rather than 206); it is unlikely by itself to high partisan bias presents a unique danger of flip control of Congress. In any event, relying institutional stasis. To see why, first imagine a on the slow accrual of malapportionment bias plan with low responsiveness and low bias. For would, at best, allow Democrats to control in example, assume the plan had 200 solidly Re-the latter part of each redistricting decade, publican districts and 200 solidly Democratic while ceding control to the Republicans in the districts. Although voters in 400 of the 435 disearlier part of each decade--hardly a satisfying tricts might be deprived a meaningful choice in strategy. the general elections, control of the House would still be determined by voters (albeit in only 35 of the 435 districts)--not by mapmaks_Some have argued that the most relevant measure of ers. Conversely, if a plan had a high degree of competitiveness and entrenchment is not the competitiveness ofindividual districts hut rather the frequency of both responsiveness and bias--say, with 150 changes in control ofthe legislature. See,e.g.,Persily,supra solidly Republican districts, 100 solidly Demonote 1, at 656.Given that it has changed hands only once crafic districts, and 185 truly competitive in the last 48 years, the U.S. House hardly does well by ones--the deck would be stacked against the this measure, but now that the parties have roughly equal support in the electorate it seems particularly germane to Democrats, but they still potentially could take considerthe likelihood of partisan changeover in the next control of the House by running strong camfour Congresses.
Second, the Rising-Tide Strategy: Democrats misplaced. On the other hand, for Democrats may look forward to a "tide" that raises all to stake their hopes of recapturing the House Democratic candidates more or less across-theon the emergence in 2004 or 2008 of a Demoboard and thus allows them to win the seats cratic Ronald Reagan might be equally dethat the Republicans won most narrowly in luded.
But very few Republicans won narrowly
Fourth, the Rifle Strategy: Democrats can try in 2002--and most of them were nonincumto pick off (or scare into retirement) most of the bents who are likely to perform much better 27 Republican Members of Congress who curwhen they benefit from their "sophomore rently represent Gore districts while holding on surge" in 2004 (typically a five-to ten-point in-to the 35 Democratic incumbents currently repcrease). 66 Even assuming that Democrats in resentlng Bush districts. Bothhalvesofthisstrat-2004 retain every single seat that they currently egy will be hard to execute. The half-dozen hold, to regain a majority in the House they Members of Congress whose districts are most would have to pick up every seat that Repubinherently hostile are all Democrats representlicans won by 7.7 percentage points or less, ing heavily Republican districts, so turnover in which would require that Democrats gain 3.9 the split-ticket districts seems more likely to help points (and Republicans lose 3.9 points) across the Republicans than to help the Democrats. 69 the board. 67Global shifts of that magnitude are Furthermore, most of the 27 split-ticket Gore disfairly rare. Each party has enjoyed two of them tricts are found in four Northeastern States in the last 35 years: Democrats in 1974 and 1982 , (New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and and Republicans in 1984 and 1994 . 68Of course, Connecticut) and many are located in extraorwhen one party has a great year, districts do dinarily expensive media markets that will benot fall like dominoes, in perfect order by parcome particularly hard to blanket with televitisan past performance. But the scarcity of close sion and radio advertising under the new Republican victories in 2002 does not bode well
McCain-Eeingold campaign-finance regime 7°f or Democrats in 2004 and beyond, a factor that may deter high-quality Democratic Third, the Cuisinart Strategy: In the course challengers who are not independently wealthy. of a decade, it is certainly possible to see maAnd with very few exceptions, the incumbents jor partisan realignments in the electorate that in those Northeastern Gore districts are among scramble past patterns and thoroughly re-the most moderate members of the House Rearrange the partisan rank-ordering of congrespublican Conference, making it harder (though sional districts. Such a realignment might nulcertainly not impossible) to accuse them of belify, or enhance, the partisan bias and the ing out of step with their constituents. noncompetitiveness that mark the 2002 plan toFifth, the Open-Seat Strategy: Recognizing day. For example, even though Gerald Ford how difficult it is to defeat Republican incumand Ronald Reagan both ran against the same bents, Democrats can focus instead on winning Democrat (Jimmy Carter), Ford's performance open seats not only in districts that Gore carin 1976 and Reagan's in 1980 resulted in very different rank-orderings of the 435 congressional districts; Reagan did not simply do six 66In 2002most of the close winners were Democrats. points better than Ford across the board. Some 67By contrast, even with only one third of the seats at Republicans believe that another scrambling of stake, Democrats would have retained their majority in the U.S. Senate in November 2002if they had improved partisan allegiances began on September 11, their performance by only 1.2 points across the board. ried but also in districts that Bush carried with treme partisan bias with record levels of inless than, say, 55% of the major-party vote. (All cumbency protection undermine political comtold, there are 266 such districts.) Like the Pas-petition not only at the level of individual dissive Strategy, this approach requires considertricts, where elections become foregone able patience. In any given two-year cycle, only conclusions, but also at the institutional level, about a tenth of the House Republicans can be by effectively barring one political party from expected to retire from Congress (or die), and taking control of the legislative body even if it most of them will vacate districts that Bush car-repeatedly garners a majority of the popular ried handily. 71
vote. But unfortunately, many of the more obSo, can we now conclude that redistricting vious avenues for reform either are unlikely to has given Republicans a decade-long "lock" on succeed in the foreseeable future or are downthe House? Probably not. Democrats in the right undesirable. This part of the Article will coming decade will almost certainly hold more make three concrete and realistic suggestions House seats than Republicans did during the for how to begin fixing a system that now apperiod from 1959 to 1994 (when they vacillated pears to be badly broken. between 140 and 192 seats). And some combination of the five strategies outlined above Judicial invalidation of extremely partisan could potentially lead them back to majority incumbent-protecting gerrymanders control of the House. But Democrats have their Perhaps the most obvious reform would be work cut out for them. Merely capturing a slim for courts to apply the federal constitutional majority of the popular vote nationwide will limits on partisan gerrymandering much more not restore their majority status in the House in this decade. To succeed, House Democratic aggressively. But there is little reason to think candidates will have to expand their campaign that will happen anytime soon. Although the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Davis v. Banstrategies and earn support from citizens who demer made partisan-gerrymandering claims have never previously voted for them--a task under the Equal Protection Clause justiciable, 72 that will severely test the party's capacity for these claims have almost never (in Professor innovation.
Gary King's phrase) been "justished." No disFurthermore, the disadvantage that Democrats tricting plan for Congress or for either house of suffer from the nonresponsiveness and pro-Republican distributional bias in the House will a state legislature has ever been invalidated under Bandemer. 73 In Bandemer itself, decided be exacerbated by a pro-Republican malappornearly 17 years ago, only two Members of the tionment bias in the Senate. Republicans today Court--Justice Powell and Justice Stevens--are relatively strong in the smaller States while voted to invalidate the challenged plan. 74To-Democrats do better in the larger States. As Table  day , it again appears that only two of the nine 7 shows, Bush carried 30 States to Gore's 20, which suggests that Republicans have an inherMembers--Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer--ent 60-to-40 head start in the battle for control of the Senate. For at least the next few election cycles, Republicans will benefit from a significant 71In the 1996,1998,and 2000House elections,Republicans relied heavily on an Open-Seat Strategy while Destructural advantage in both chambers, mocrats relied (with somewhat more success) on a Rifle 640N.W.2d849,860-64(Mich. 2002) .
public (and bipartisan) deliberation and led to The O'Lear plaintiffs raised three legal theotwo serious substantive errors. Specifically, one ries in both the district court and the Supreme district turned out to be noncontiguous (a de-Court. The thrust of their argument was that, fect cured by amendment the next day, immealthough the Constitution certainly does not diately before the legislature adjourned for the mandate proportional representation, it does summer). And the plan as a whole violated the prohibit partisan manipulation of district lines principle of "one person, one vote," as 4,578 designed to dictate electoral outcomes and to Michiganders were not assigned to any of the consign a political party to one-third or less of State's 15 congressional districts. By the time a State's congressional seats even if that party the second error was discovered, the legislature consistently wins a majority of the popular vote was on summer recess. Sending the bill back statewide. Each of the plaintiffs' three legal thefor amendment in the fall would have opened ories took aim at the problem from a different it to precisely the kind of public scrutiny that angle. Because the facts in the Michigan case the rushed process was designed to avoid. At-were so strong (and in any event had to be ter several embarrassing news reports and a taken as true, since the case was dismissed for handful of meetings with the Republican leadfailure to state a cognizable claim), the Supreme ership, the Secretary of the Senate opted to Court's summary affirmance sends a strong "fix" the mistake unilaterally. She sent the re-message about the current state of the law. vised bill to Governor John Engler, and he Therefore, it is worthwhile to recount the plainsigned it at 4:54 p.m. The O'Lear plaintiffs argued that bringing the natory effects in a partisan-gerrymandering standards for judging partisan and racial gercase: (1) the likely partisan skew must be se-rymandering into closer alignment would invere, handing a supermajority of the seats to ject some refreshing candor into the field of reone political party even if its candidates con-districting litigation, which has suffered from sistently receive less than half the popular vote a shortage of it. All too often, what are in realstatewide; (2) the likely duration of the skew ity partisan battles get fought out in the courts must exceed a single election cycle and stretch under the guise of racial controversies, using on for most or all of the decade; and (3) the either the Shaw doctrine or the Voting Rights skew must be sufficient to strip effective con-Act. Reconciling Bandemer and Shaw would retrol from the majority and deliver it to a mi-duce the incentives for racially inflammatory nority faction. 
